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We analyze reputation in a game between a large player and a continuum of
long-lived small players in which state variables affect players’ payoffs. The large
player’s type is private information. We give conditions under which in every Nash
equilibrium a very patient large player will get almost the largest payoff consistent
with the small players choosing a best response in a large finite truncation of the
game. While our results apply to the time inconsistency problem of optimal govern-
ment policy, we show that for the durable goods monopoly reputation may fail to
improve the monopolist’s payoff. Journal of Economic Literature Classification
Numbers: C72, C73.
1. Introduction
We consider dynamic games with one larger player and a large number
(continuum) of small players. Large and small players are long lived and
their payoffs are affected by state variables whose evolution is described by
a possibly stochastic transition law. As is standard in reputation models,
we suppose that the large player’s type is private information and that he
may be a ‘‘commitment type’’ who is locked into playing a particular
strategy.
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The purpose of the paper is to investigate the extent to which an uncom-
mitted or ‘‘normal’’ type of the large player can exploit his opponents’
uncertainty to establish a reputation for a particular behavior.
One application of this model is a policy game in which a government
faces a large number of households (see Fischer [10] and Chari and Kehoe
[3]). The government must decide, for example, on capital and labor taxes
and households choose investment and labor supply. A second application
is the analysis of a market for a durable good in which there is a monopoly
seller and a continuum of potential buyers (see Coase [4], Gul et al. [15]).
Previous work on reputation has considered repeated games and in most
studies it was assumed that a long-lived player faces a short-lived (or
myopic) opponent (see Kreps and Wilson [17], Milgrom and Roberts
[22], Fudenberg and Levine [12, 13]). We are interested in a situation in
which all players are long-lived but we will assume that the game is
anonymous in the sense that a deviation by a single small player does not
affect the public history of the game.1
In a repeated game our anonymity assumption implies that each small
player will play a short-run best response in each period to that period’s
expected play since his actions do not affect his future payoffs or the public
history of the game. Consequently, in a repeated game the best possible
commitment for the long-run player is to the Stackelberg strategy for the
corresponding static game. Moreover, the long-run player only needs to
convince his effectively myopic opponents that he will follow the Stackelberg
strategy in the current period in order to achieve the Stackelberg payoff for
that period.
The case of dynamic games differs from that of repeated games in two
ways. First, the optimal commitment strategy will generally not be a con-
stant action in every period. Second, the small players’ current play may
depend on expected future play of the large player. As a consequence the
large player may have to demonstrate that he follows the commitment
strategy not only in the current period but also for a large number of future
periods. For example, suppose that the large player is a government decid-
ing whether to place a tax on capital or on labor and small players are
households who can decide how much to invest. If capital does not
depreciate in one period, households will choose a high investment level
today only if they are convinced that the government will set low capital
tax rates for a sufficient number of future periods.
Our analysis will be carried out in two parts. In Section 3 we derive a
lower bound on equilibrium payoffs of an arbitrarily patient large player
1 As Levine and Pesendorfer [20] demonstrate, anonymous equilibria can be obtained as
the limit of equilibrium outcomes in games with a large, finite number of small players and
noisy observability of each small player’s action.
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playing against small players having a fixed discount factor strictly smaller
than 1. Theorem 1 shows that in every Nash equilibrium an arbitrarily
patient large player’s payoff is bounded below by the average payoff he
could get by optimal commitment in a large finite truncation of the game
when the initial state is the least favorable among all the states that can be
reached under this commitment strategy.
We apply Theorem 1 to a stylized version of a capital taxation model
and to a game illustrating the durable goods monopoly problem. In both
cases, the payoff bound is tight, i.e., the large player receives the largest
payoff consistent with small players behaving optimally.
Theorem 1 does not provide a tight payoff bound in games in which small
players can get ‘‘trapped’’ in states that give the large player a low payoff.
Suppose that the large player wishes to commit to a strategy which leads to
a very undesirable state if the small players do not play a best response to
that strategy. In this case reputation arguments do not work since by the
time small players learn that the large player is following this commitment
strategy it may be too late for them to avoid the undesirable state. We give
an example of a trade liberalization game, similar to Matsuyama [21], in
which this issue arises.
The second part of the analysis is presented in Section 4, where we
consider the case in which the large and the small players are equally
patient. This case is particularly relevant for policy games, in which the payoff
function of the government is typically related to the payoff functions of
private agents. Theorem 2 shows that the large player will be able to exploit
his reputation if the transition function satisfies the following reversibility
condition. A transition function exhibits reversibility if for every strategy of
a small player and for every deviation from that strategy there is a return
strategy that leads to the path of the original strategy or to a better path
within a bounded number of periods.
The reversibility condition is satisfied in capital accumulation games, but
is not satisfied in the standard durable goods monopoly. Once a customer
has purchased the durable good, he has reached an irreversible state. We
give an example that demonstrates how in the durable goods monopoly
reputational arguments fail to guarantee the large player his optimal
commitment payoff.
Our analysis is related to the literature on reputation with two long-run
players. Schmidt [24] and Cripps et al. [7] analyze two-player repeated
games with one patient and one non-myopic but less patient player and
show how incorrect off-equilibrium-path beliefs can weaken reputation
effects. By introducing imperfect observability of actions, Celentani et al.
[5] ensure that the less patient player can learn the full strategy of the
patient player and in turn that the latter can establish a reputation for
playing strategies that use rewards and punishments.
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The difference between the current study and the studies on reputation
with two long-lived players is that our anonymity assumption implies that
an individual small player cannot be deterred from playing a best response
to their beliefs about equilibrium-path play of other players. This enables
us to extend our results to the case in which both players are arbitrarily
patient.
Our work is also related to the literature on dynamic games. Dutta [9]
provides a Folk theorem for stochastic games. Chari and Kehoe [3] and
Stokey [25] study the time inconsistency problem introduced by Kydland
and Prescott [18, 19] and Fischer [10] and characterize the set of equi-
libria in problems of optimal policy design when the government cannot
commit.
Both Chari and Kehoe [3] and Stokey [25] show that, if there is
sufficiently little discounting, a desirable outcome (the Ramsey outcome in
a capital taxation model, Ramsey [23]) can arise in equilibrium. However,
in their model the Ramsey outcome is only one of many equilibria2 while
our results suggest that it may be the unique Nash equilibrium outcome if
reputational arguments are used.
In addition, we give an example of a capital taxation model (Section 2.1)
for which the optimal commitment outcome cannot be achieved as a Nash
equilibrium of the complete information game even if all players are very
patient. Nevertheless, if we introduce commitment types in this example,
our results show that a patient government will achieve the optimal
commitment payoff.
2. Description of the Game
We consider a game with one large player and a continuum of identical
small players i # [0, 1]=I. The finite sets Y and X denote the sets of
actions of the large player and the small players, respectively; y # Y, x # X.
Let R denote the set of mixed actions for the large player and let S denote
the set of mixed actions for a small player. Each small player is charac-
terized by his state, z # Z, where Z is finite. Let 4 denote the set of prob-
ability measure on Z, * # 4, and let M denote the set of probability
measures on Z_X, + # M; +(z, x) is to be interpreted as the measure of
small players in state z that choose action x.
2 It is sometimes argued that in this case the government may be able to select its preferred
equilibrium. Dekel and Farell [8], however, show that these selection arguments are
inconsistent.
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The game is played in the following way: At the beginning of each period
t=1, 2, ... the public history (to be described below) is observed by all
players and each small player observes his own private history. Conditional
on these observations, every small player chooses a mixed action s(i) # S
and the large player simultaneously chooses a mixed action r # R. After
these actions have been selected, payoffs occur and all players observe the
realization of the mixed action of the large player yt and the distribution
+t of actions of the small players; +t is a joint distribution over actions and
states, i.e., after each period every player learns the measure of small
players in state z whose mixed action had a realization x, for every
(z, x) # Z_X. Note however, that +t does not reveal the play of any
individual small player since +t is unaffected by deviations of sets of players
of measure zero.
The law of motion for the state variables of the small players is described
by the function f : Y_M_X_Z  4. Thus *t+1(i)=f ( yt , +t , xt(i), zt(i))
describes the probability distribution over the states of player i in period
t+1, given aggregate play and player i ’s action and state in period t. We
assume that f is continuous on M. Note that if zt(i) and st(i) are
measurable functions then *t+1(i) is a measurable function. By *t=
I *t (i) di we denote the aggregate state3 in period t, where *t (z) denotes
the fraction of small players that are in state z in period t.
The initial state of the game is a measurable function z0 : I  Z. We
assume that z0 is common knowledge for all players. The public history of
the game at time t consists of the sequence of realizations of y{ , +{ ,
{=1, ..., t&1. For notational convenience the history at time t also
includes *{ , {=1, ..., t, where *1=I z0(i) di.
4 The set of histories in period
t is denoted by Ht=(Y_M_4)t&1_4, with ht # Ht ; h1=*1 and ht=
(ht&1 , yt&1 , +t&1, *t) for t>1. The set of infinite histories will be denoted
by H=H . For the history from t$ to t, t$<t, we write ht "ht$ # Ht&t$ . A
private history for a small player is a sequence of states and actions. The
set of private histories in period t is denoted by h t=Xt&1_Zt&1_Z.
For a given sequence of play ( y, +)=(( yt , +t)t=1) the payoff to the large
player is
(1&;) :

t=1
;t&1w( yt , +t).
3 Implicitly in the definition of the aggregate state we assume that the strong law of large
numbers holds with a continuum of random variables (see Judd [16]). However, as Levine
and Pesendorfer [20] show for a different context, the model with a continuum of small
players can be interpreted as the limit of a model with a finite number of players and noisy
observation of the aggregate play of the small players.
4 Notice that given the transition law, *t is determined by +t&1 , yt&1.
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Similarly, for a given sequence ( y, +, x, z)=(( yt , +t , xt , zt)t=1) the payoff
to a small player is
(1&$) :

t=1
$t&1v( yt , +t , xt , zt).
This notation allows us to describe types of small players with different
payoff functions by an appropriate choice of state variables and the initial
state. We illustrate this in the example describing the durable goods
monopoly below.
Assumption 1. w, v, and f are continuous on M. Moreover 0v, wv .
A mixed (behavioral) strategy for the large player in period t is a
mapping \t : Ht  R. Similarly a mixed strategy for the small players in
period t is a measurable function _t : [0, 1]_Ht_h t  S, _=(_t)t=1. We
assume throughout this paper that the strong law of large numbers holds
for a continuum of i.i.d. random variables. Thus, given a strategy _ of the
small players and a sequence of action ( yt) for the large player a unique
sequence of public outcomes ( yt , +t) is induced.5
Let _ t : Ht  M denote an aggregate strategy for the small players in
period t, _ =(_ )t=1. We say that _ is an aggregate strategy for _ and
the initial state z0 if for any sequence ( yt) # Y, (( yt), _, z0) and
(( yt), _ , I z0(i) di) induce the same public history h. Note that if _ is an
aggregate strategy for (_, z0) then _ (ht) is uniquely determined for all
public histories ht for which all but a measure zero subset of small players
have followed _t$(i) for all t$<t. For histories that are reached following a
deviation of a positive measure of small players the aggregate strategy can
be arbitrary. This is done for notational convenience since histories that
follow simultaneous deviations of small players are irrelevant.
The payoff of every player depends on his own strategy, on the large
player’s action, and on the aggregate strategy of the small players. We
denote by V($, \, _ , _(i), ht , h t(i)) the expected payoff to player i from
playing _(i), after history (ht , h t(i)) if the aggregate strategy of the small
players is _ . Similarly W(;, \, _ , ht) is the expected payoff to the large
player after history ht if the aggregate strategy of the small players is _ .
5 The aggregate outcome in period 1 is defined as +1(x, z)=[i: z0(i)=z] _1(i)(x) di. Suppose
that +1 , ..., +t&1 are determined. Then for every small player i, z0(i), (_1(i), ..., _t(i)) together
with +1 , ..., +t&1 and y1 , ..., yt&1 induce a probability distribution git on M, where g
i
t(x, z) is
the probability that agent i is in state z and chooses action x in period t. Moreover, note that
git is a measurable function of i since z0(i) and _(i) are measurable. Thus we can define
+t=I git di.
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2.1. Example 1
This example is a stylized version of the classic time inconsistency
problem of government policy (see Fischer [10], Chari and Kehoe [3]).
Suppose the large player is a government that must choose whether to
place a tax on capital income or use a distortionary labor tax in an effort
to raise adequate revenue. Small players are households who decide how
much of their current endowment to consume and how much to invest. The
government decides on taxes: yz and yl are the capital and labor tax rates
respectively. Consumers are born with no capital (z1=0) and have a labor
income of 1 each period (before taxes). If a consumer invests 12 units of
his income, then he has one unit of capital in the following period (z=1).
Furthermore, capital does not depreciate and any further investment does
not increase the capital stock. One unit of capital produces one unit of
income every period. Thus the consumer’s actions are given by X=
[0, 12]. The consumer’s utility in period t is given by:6
v( yt , xt , zt)=zt(1&yzt )+(1&y
l
t c)&xt ,
where c&1>0 is the cost of imposing a distortionary labor tax.7
Government utility is equal to the sum of the households’ utility, minus
a penalty in the case the revenue is different from 1. Let *1t denote the
fraction of households who are in state z=1. Let +xt denote the fraction
of households who choose x=12 in period t. Then,
w( yt , +t)=*1t (1&y
z
t )+(1&y
l
t c)&+
x
t 2&P } | y
z
t *
1
t +y
l
t&1|.
We assume that P>c>1 and that the government is at least as patient as
the households, i.e., ;$. It is straightforward to show that *1t =0 is the
unique Nash equilibrium outcome8 for all ;$ # [0, 1). Even though for
$>13 a social planner would want to invest and reach state *1=1, this
state cannot be achieved as an equilibrium.
6 For simplicity, instead of a budget constraint, we assume that the consumer has a direct
disutility of investing.
7 As is standard in capital taxation models (see, e.g., Chari and Kehoe [3]) the government
can enforce capital taxes even though it cannot observe individual states. One justification for
this assumption is that there is an enforcement agency that can actually observe individual
states whereas the agent who makes the policy decision has no access to this information.
Alternatively, we can assume that the large player can observe individual histories but his
strategy only depends on the aggregate history of the game. In this way we select a subset of
the set of Nash equilibria. Fudenberg et al. [14] show that this equilibrium selection can be
justified if with small probability the small players’ chosen action is different from the
observed action.
8 For a proof see Celentani and Pesendorfer [6].
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2.2. Example 2
The following example is a simple version of the durable goods
monopoly. Suppose there are two types of buyers H and L. The reservation
price of type H, rH, for the durable good is 5, the reservation price of type
L, rL, is 2. There is mass 12 of both types of buyers. The large player is
the seller of the good. Every period the monopolist sets a price yt where
yt # [0, 1n, ..., (5n&1)n]; n6. If the buyer did not previously purchase
the good he is in state z=(0, H) if he is a high type and state z=(0, L) if
he is a low type. If the buyer is in state 0 in period t he can either take
action 0 (he does not buy) or action 1 (he buys). If the buyer buys in
period t at a price y then he moves to ‘‘state’’ ( y, j), j=H, L, where he stays
forever (i.e., each sale is ‘‘final’’) enjoying a per period payoff of
(1&$)(r j&y).
Thus the transition function is defined as
f (xt , zt , yt)={( yt , j )zt
with probability 1 if xt=1 and zt=(0, j ).
with probability 1 otherwise.
We assume that the marginal cost of producing the good is zero. Therefore,
if +1t denotes the fraction of buyers who purchase in period t, the payoff to
the large player in period t is wt( yt , +t)=yt } +1t .
Suppose that $=;. In this case Gul et al. [15] show that for large n and
for $ close to one the payoff for the monopolist in any subgame perfect
equilibrium is close to 2.
2.3. Example 3
The following example is a modified version of the trade liberalization
game analyzed by Matsuyama [21].
A government (large player) faces a large number of firms (small players)
which can be in one of three states, Z=[0, 1, 2]. A firm in state 1 is
competitive on the international market whereas a firm in state 0 is not. A
firm in state 2 is out of business. All firms are initially in state 0. Firms in
state 0 can invest (x=1) or not invest (x=0). If a firm in state 0 invests
in period t then from period t+1 on it is in state 1. The government can
liberalize in the current period ( y=0) or not liberalize ( y=1). If the
government liberalizes in period t then all firms who are in state 0 are
driven out of business and hence move to state 2 and stay there forever
after. The government’s per period payoff is zero if it does not liberalize
and is equal to the fraction of firms who are in state 1 if it liberalizes. The
idea is that the government prefers to liberalize but it also wants its firms
to survive international competition. Firms’ payoffs are
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&x if z=2 or y=1, z=0
v( y, x, z)={1&x if z=11&x if z=0, y=0.
Clearly, it is a subgame perfect equilibrium of this game for the firms
never to invest and for the government never to liberalize.
3. Reputation and Equilibrium Payoffs
In the first part of this section we derive a benchmark for the payoff of
the large player when he can commit to a strategy in large finite trunca-
tions of the game.
Fix a strategy \. Suppose the large player plays the following ‘‘restarting’’
strategy: he follows \ for T periods; in period T+1 the large player restarts
strategy \, i.e., he follows \ for the initial state *T+1 from period T on; in
period 2T+1 he again restarts \, and so on. The set 4(\, *) is the set of
aggregate states that can be reached if the initial aggregate state is * and
the large player uses a restarting strategy based on \ with no additional
restrictions imposed on small players’ strategies.9
Definition 1. 4(\, *)#k=1 4k(\, *), where 4k(\, *) is defined as
follows:
(i) *$ # 41(\, *) if there exists a (_, z0) with I z0(i) di=* such that if
(\, _) is played and the initial state is z0 then there is a t such that the
aggregate state in period t is *$.
(ii) For k>1, *$ # 4k(\, *) if there exists a (_, z0) with
I z0(i) di # 4k&1(\, *) such that if (\, _) is played and the initial state is z0
then there is a t such that the aggregate state in period t is *$.
In Example 1 above, 4(\, *)=4 for all (\, *), since every state can be
reached independent of the actions of the large player. In Example 2,
however, the actions of the large player determine the set of aggregate
states that can be reached. If, for example, the large player chooses a
strategy according to which the price is never below 5, then 4(\, *)
contains only the initial aggregate state together with all aggregate states
in which some of the buyers move from their initial state to state y=5.
In the following, when we define the payoff a large player can guarantee
himself by committing to \ we assume that the worst aggregate state in
4(\, *) is realized.
9 Recall that a strategy pair (_, \) together with an initial state z0 induce a deterministic
sequence of aggregate states (*t).
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The T-period expected average payoff of the large player if (\, _ ) are
played and the initial state is * is defined as
WT (\, _ , *)=
1
T
E _ :
T
t=1
w( yt , +t) | \, _ , *&.
Similarly, for small player i we define the discounted payoff in period t of
a T-period truncation of the game as
V Tt ($, \, _ , _(i), ht , h t(i))
=
1&$
1&$T&t+1
E _ :
T
t$=t
$t$&tw( yt$ , +t$ , xt$ , zt$(i)) | \, _ , _(i ), ht , h t(i)&.
Define V Tt (1, } )=lim$  1 V
T
t ($, } ) to be the average (undiscounted) payoff
in period t of a T-period truncation of the game.
By BT (=, $, \, *) we denote the aggregate strategies of the small players
that are generated if the small players choose an = best response to \ in
every period of a T-period truncation of the game with the exception of the
last = fraction of periods.
Definition 2. _ # BT (=, $, \, *) if there exists a strategy _ and an initial
state z0 such that:
(1) *=I z0(i) di and _ is an aggregate strategy for (_, z0).
(2) For all t=1, ..., T&{ with {<T= and for all i # I,
VTt ($, \, _ , _(i), ht , h t(i))V
T
t ($, \, _ , _$(i), ht , h t(i))&= for all _$(i) and for
all ht , h t(i) that are reached with strictly positive probability under
(\, _ , _(i)) when the initial state is (*, z0(i)).
In the following we define W*($, *) as the set containing all undiscounted
(average) payoffs that the large player can get in large finite truncations of
the game if he commits to a pure strategy \ and if the worst aggregate state
*$ # 4(\, *) and the worst strategy in BT (=, $, \, *$) are realized.
Definition 3. w # W*($, *) if for every ’>0 there is an =>0 such that
for every T $< there is a T>T $ and a pure strategy \ with
WT (\, _ , *$)w&’ for all *$ # 4(\, *) and for all _ # BT (=, $, \, *$).
The goal of the rest of this section is to show that if there is incomplete
information about the type of the large player then the Nash equilibrium
payoff of a patient large player is bounded below by the largest element
(supremum) in the set W*($, *) if * is the initial aggregate state of the
game (Theorem 1).
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We assume that the large player can be one of countably many types
| # 0 and that these types are drawn from a common knowledge prior p
assigning a strictly positive probability to all points in 0. The large player
is informed of his type before play begins, but this is purely private
knowledge and is not revealed to the small players. The large player’s
payoff function now also depends on his type, W(;, \, _ , |, ht). We will
focus on a particular type |0 # 0 which we refer to as the rational type.
Payoffs for the rational type are as defined in the previous section, i.e.,
W(;, \, _ , |0 , ht)#W(;, \, _ , ht).
A type behavior strategy for the large player specifies a time-indexed
sequence of maps from public histories to mixed actions for that type. We
denote these by \(|). Since the small players cannot observe the type of
the large players, the definition of a strategy for the small players remains
unchanged.
A Nash equilibrium for initial state z0 is a ((\(|))| # 0 , _) such that if _
is an aggregate strategy for (_, z0), I z0(i) di=*, then for all | # 0,
W(;, \(|), _ , |, *)W(;, \$(|), _ , |, *) for all \$(|) and all | # 0 and
:
| # 0
p(|) V($, (\(|)), _ , _(i), *, z0(i))
 :
| # 0
p(|) V(;, (\(|)), _ , _$(i), *, z0(i))
for all i # I and for all _$(i).
Remark. An alternative interpretation of the game is that the individual
histories of small players are publicly observable but that equilibrium
strategies only depend on public histories (and on own individual histories
for small players). Under this interpretation we select a subset of Nash
equilibria in which small players are strategically anonymous.10
It is easy to show by taking limits of finite truncations of this infinite
game that Nash equilibria exist. See, for example, Fudenberg and Levine
[11].
Next we define a collection of commitment types which are assumed to
have strictly positive prior probability. These types are the analog of the
‘‘Stackelberg type’’ in the literature on reputation in repeated games (see
Fudenberg and Levine [12]). Given $ and the initial state * we denote by
\*(T, n, $, *) a pure strategy which gives the large player an average payoff
that is within 1n of the supremum of all payoffs that he can achieve by
10 Fudenberg, Levine, and Pesendorfer [14] show that if each small player’s action is
imperfectly observable (even if this imperfection is very small) then the equilibrium of a game
with a finite number of small players converges to an equilibrium in which small players are
strategically anonymous as the number of small players goes to infinity.
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committing to a pure strategy in a T-period truncation of the game subject
to small players playing a 1n best response with the possible exception of
the last 1n fraction of periods. More precisely, \*(T, n, $, *) satisfies
inf
*$ # 4(\*, *)
inf
_ # BT(1n, $, \*, *$)
WT (\*, _ , *$)
sup
\ # Y
inf
*$ # 4(\, *)
inf
_ # BT(1n, $, \, *$)
WT (\, _ , *$)&1n, (1)
where Y denotes the set of pure strategies for the large player.
Now we define the strategy \(T, n, $) as follows: In period t=kT+{,
1{T, k=0, 1, ...,
\t(T, n, $)(ht)=\*{ (T, n, $, h1)(ht "hkT), (2)
where h1 #*1 is the aggregate state in the beginning of the game. Let
|(T, n, $) denote the type that plays the strategy \(T, n, $), or in other
words ‘‘restarts’’ the strategy \*(T, n, $, h1) every T periods. Note that the
set of commitment types [|(T, n, $), T=1, 2, ...; n=1, 2, ...] is a countable
set and therefore we can assume that each type has a strictly positive prior
probability.
Let Nl (;, $, *) denote the least (inf) expected payoff to the large player
conditional on type |0 in any Nash equilibrium if the initial aggregate state
is *. We are now in the position to state our first result.
Theorem 1. Suppose that Assumption 1 is satisfied and that
|(T, n, $) # 0 for all (T, n). Then lim inf;  1Nl (;, $, *)sup W*($, *).
Theorem 1 says that in every Nash equilibrium a patient large player
gets at least the time average of payoffs corresponding to an optimal com-
mitment in a large finite truncation of the game.
The intuition for this result can be summarized as follows. First, suppose
that the small players believe that the large player will play a particular
strategy for T future periods with very high probability. We show that
in this case behavior of the small players in the first T periods implies
that they choose an = best response for a T period truncation of the
game provided that T is sufficiently large. In a second step we show that
if the large player imitates any commitment type that has positive prior
probability then there is at most a finite number of periods in which the
small players believe that the probability that the large player will play the
commitment strategy in the following T periods is bounded away from 1.
Finally, we can split the game into T-period ‘‘superstages,’’ i.e., the first
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T periods are the first superstage, the second T periods are the second
superstage, and so on. Since = and T were arbitrary, the large player can
guarantee himself a payoff arbitrarily close to the best payoff in W*($, *)
in all but a finite number of ‘‘abnormal’’ superstages. In the limit, as ;  1,
the abnormal superstages do not affect the large player’s payoff and the
theorem follows.
3.1. The Examples with Reputation
3.1.1. Example 1. In the time-consistency example, when *1=0, the
unique Nash equilibrium payoff of the government is 1&c<0. For the
perturbed game we can apply Theorem 1 to compute a lower bound for
all Nash equilibrium payoffs. As can be verified easily, if $>13,
sup W*($, *)=1 and hence a patient large player gets a payoff of almost
1 in every Nash equilibrium of the perturbed game.
The following strategy is an example for a commitment strategy that
achieves this payoff. As long as the aggregate capital stock is below 1 the
government rewards investment with zero taxes on capital for a number of
periods which is just sufficient to give households an incentive to invest.
Thus the commitment strategy is yzt =0 for all t such that * t&{<1 and y
z
t =1
otherwise, where { is the smallest integer that satisfies $(1&${)(1&$)>12.
For large finite truncations of the game the average payoff of the large
player is 1 if he plays this commitment strategy and the small players
choose an = best response in all but the last = fraction of periods.
3.1.2. Example 2. In the durable goods monopoly case, the monopolist
can guarantee himself a payoff close to the total consumer surplus in the
perturbed game. To see this note that the following strategy is a possible
commitment strategy: Choose pt=(5n&1)n for { periods. If half of
the consumers purchase by period { then the monopolist sets a price of
(2n&1)n for t$>{ on. Otherwise the monopolist chooses a price of
(5n&1)n for all t$={+1, ..., 2{, and so on. If { is chosen so that
${(5&(2n&1)n)<1n, an = best response to this strategy in any truncated
game with sufficiently large T and sufficiently small = implies that all
consumers whose evaluation is 5 purchase in the first period and all other
consumers purchase in period {+1. Moreover, the only aggregate states
that can be reached under this strategy are states in which either all
purchases are made at a price of (5n&1)n or all high types purchase at
a price of (5n&1)n. Therefore, sup W*($, *)=72&2(2n), which is close
to 72 for large n.
3.1.3. Example 3. The simple trade liberalization example highlights the
difference between being able to commit to a strategy and establishing
a reputation for playing a particular strategy in a dynamic game. For
Example 3, Theorem 1 does not imply a payoff larger than the worst
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subgame perfect equilibrium in the unperturbed game. To see this note that
for any policy for which ‘‘investing’’ is an = best response for the firms (for
small =) the government must choose a policy \ according to which
‘‘liberalization’’ is chosen in some period. But this implies that 4(\, *)=4,
and therefore the aggregate state in which every firm has gone out of
business is an element in 4(\, *). Clearly, if all firms have gone out of
business the payoff to the government is zero and hence sup W*($, *)=0.
The government cannot exploit a reputation in this example since in order
to build up a reputation it has to liberalize. Liberalization, on the other
hand, will lead to an undesirable state if the firms do not play a best
response to the commitment strategy. Since there is no reason why
firms should always play a best response to the commitment strategy, the
government cannot benefit from establishing a reputation.
3.2. Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of Theorem 1 uses two preliminary lemmas. In Lemma 1 we
investigate the consequences of imitating a particular commitment type on
the beliefs of the small players and we show that if the large player chooses
to imitate a pure strategy of a particular commitment type; then in all but
finitely many periods the small players will actually believe that with high
probability the aggregate play will be consistent with this strategy being
played in the next { periods. Both the formulation and the proof of
Lemma 1 are extensions of a result in Fudenberg and Levine [12].
Let \ be the pure strategy played by a particular commitment type |*.
Let h* be the event that yt=\t(ht) for all ht that are reached following
(\, _) starting from a given h1=*1 . Furthermore let p(|*)=p* denote the
prior probability of type |*. Let ?{t(\) be the probability that in the next
{ periods the actions of the large player are consistent with \, i.e., the prob-
ability that in periods t, t+1, ..., t+{&1 aggregate play is consistent with
\ being played, ?{t(\)=Pr[yt=\t(ht), ..., yt+{&1=\t+{&1(ht+{&1) | ht&1 , _].
Finally, let n(?{t(\)? ) be the random variable denoting the number of
periods in which ?{t(\)? .
Lemma 1. Let 0<? <1 and suppose that p*>0 and that (\, _) are such
that Pr(h* | |*)=1. Then
Pr _n(?{t(\)? )>{ log p*log ? } h*&=0.
Remark. Note that since certain states may not be reached along a
given history h*, the small players will not get convinced that the large
player actually uses the same strategy as the commitment type. However,
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since no individual small player can affect the aggregate state, the play in
public histories that are not reached is irrelevant for any small player’s
decision problem.
Proof. Let | * denote the event that |{|*. Then by Bayes’s law we
have
Pr(|* |ht+1)
=Pr(|* | \t(ht), ht)
=
Pr(|* | ht) Pr(\t(ht) | |*)
Pr(|* | ht) Pr(\t(ht) | |*)+(1&Pr(|* | ht)) Pr(\t(ht) | | *)
. (3)
Notice that Pr(\t(ht) | |*)=1 and that the denominator of (3) is equal to
Pr(\t(ht)). Therefore (3) can be rewritten as
Pr(|* | ht+1)=
Pr(|* | ht)
Pr(\t(ht))
. (4)
Notice that for any {, Pr( yt=\t(ht))=Pr( yt$=\t$(ht$), t$=t, ..., t+
{&1)+Pr( yt=\t(ht), yt$ {\t$(ht$), for some t$=t+1, ..., t+{&1). Recall
that ?{t(\)=Pr( yt$=\t$(ht$), t$=t, ..., t+{&1), and let ?
{
t(\)=Pr( yt=
\t(ht), yt$ {\t$(ht$), for some t$=t+1, ..., t+{&1), i.e., ? {t(\) is the
probability that the large player’s play is in accordance with \ at time t
but differs at some point in the next {&1 periods. Then, for any fixed {
equation (4) can be rewritten as
Pr(|* | ht+1)=
Pr(|* | ht)
?{t(\)+?
{
t(\)
.
Suppose that ?{t(\)? for all t$=t, ..., t+{&1. Then if the large player
plays like the commitment type for t$=t, ..., t+{&1 (i.e., yt$=\t$(ht$)),
the probability that he is type |* has to go up by a factor of at least
1? (because if yt$=\t$(ht$) for all t$=t, ..., t+{&1, then at some t$=
t, ..., t+{&1, ? {t(\) will be updated to zero). Given that Pr(|* | h1)=p*,
after { periods Pr(|* | h{+1)p*? . If ?{t(\)? for {K periods during
which yt=\(ht), in every period then Pr(|* | hK } {+1)p*? K. However,
since
Pr(|* | ht)1 (5)
if
p*? K>1, (6)
inequality (5) is violated and a contradiction to the hypothesis that
?{t(\)? for all t$=t, ..., t+K } {&1 is obtained. Taking the log of (6) the
condition becomes K>log p*log ? and the proof is complete. K
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The following lemma shows that if the small players believe that with
high enough probability the large player will play a given strategy in a
large enough truncation of the game, then they will play an = best response
to it.
Lemma 2. Suppose Assumption 1 is satisfied. For any =>0, $<1 there
are :>0 and T <, such that, for a fixed pure strategy \ and an initial
aggregate state *, if the probability that \ is followed in the first TT
periods is greater than 1&:, then if the small players play a best response,
_ # BT (=, $, \, *). Moreover : and T are independent of \ and *.
Proof. Let Vt*T(i) be the maximal discounted payoff of a small player
in period t if the game ends in period T and (\, _ ) is being played.
(The maximum is taken over the individuals’ action x1 , ..., xT .) If
_  BT (=, $, \, *) then there is a period 1tT&{ and an i such that the
expected payoff in period t is bounded above by
(1&$T&t+1)((1&:)(Vt*T(i)&=)+:v )+$T&t+1v .
On the other hand, by playing a _(i) that is a best response in the T-period
truncation player i gets at least (1&$T&t+1)(1&:) V t*T(i). Note that
[(1&$T&t+1)((1&:)(V*Tt (i)&=)+:v )+$
T&t+1v ]
&[(1&$T&t+1)(1&:) Vt*T(i)]
<(1&${)(1&:)(&=)+:v +${v <0
for { sufficiently large and : sufficiently close to zero. In addition we can
choose T so that {T<= and hence the lemma follows. K
Proof of Theorem 1. Choose an n* such that for all T there are a T>T
and a \*(T, n*, $, *) that satisfy
inf
*$ # 4(\*, *)
inf
_ # BT(1n*, $, \*, *$)
WT (\*, _ , *$)sup W*($, *)&’. (7)
Note that for all ’>0 and for all * there is an n* such that (7) is satisfied
(this follows from the definition of W*($, *)). Now we can choose T*>T
sufficiently large and :*>0 sufficiently small so that Lemma 1 is satisfied
for (=*=1n*, :*, T*).
Suppose the large player imitates type $(T*, n*, $), who is committed to
\(T*, n*, $) and whose prior probability is p*>0. Even though we do not
claim that imitating type |(T*, n, $) is part of an equilibrium, the large
player’s equilibrium payoff cannot be smaller than the payoff the large
player could get by playing such a strategy. In the following we compute
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a lower bound on the payoff the large player could get by playing this
strategy, which will in turn provide a lower bound on his equilibrium
payoffs.
Let ?T*t be the probability that \(T*, n*, $) is played in the periods
t, t+1, ..., t+T*&1. Let N*=T* log p*log (1&:*). Lemma 1 implies
that ?T*t <1&:* for fewer than N* periods, which in turn implies that
?T*kT*+1<1&:* for fewer than N* different k. Thus for all but at most N*
different k we have _ (hkT*+1) # BT*(1n*, $, \*, *kT*+1), which in turn
implies that for all but at most N* different k
WT*(\(T*, n*, $), _ , *kT*+1)sup W*($, *)&’.
Therefore if the large player imitates type |(T*, n*, $) his payoff is at least
;N*T*(sup W*($, *)&’).
Since ’ can be chosen arbitrarily small the theorem follows. K
4. Patient Small Players
In Theorem 1 we assume that the discount factor of the small players
is bounded away from one while the large player is arbitrarily patient.
In applications like policy games the utility function of the large player
frequently reflects the utility function of the small players (e.g., the large
player’s preferences are identical to the utility function of the ‘‘median
voter’’). Moreover, a standard motivation for player’s patience is a short-
ening of the interval between dates. In this case, if all players are long-lived,
all discount factors have to tend to 1 at the same rate. For these reasons
it is important to identify classes of games where reputation allows the
large player to achieve essentially his commitment payoff when both the
large and the small players become arbitrarily patient simultaneously.
The difficulty in establishing a reputation with patient small players
stems from the fact that small players may become increasingly reluctant to
take an action that leads to a particular irreversible state as they get more
patient. Thus to convince a very patient small player to take this action the
large player may have to establish a reputation for following the commit-
ment strategy for very many periods and hence it may take ‘‘too long’’
to establish a reputation that induces small players to enter a particular
irreversible state.
For the sake of simplicity in this section we specialize to a deterministic
transition function; formally we assume that if *(i)=f ( y, +, x, z) then
*(i)(z) # [0, 1].11
11 A similar result can be obtained for the case of a stochastic transition function.
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Definition 4. State z^ dominates state z given (\(|)| # 0), _ , * if there is
a _^(i) and a $ <1 such that
V($, \(|), _ , _(i), *, z)V($, \(|), _ , _^(i), *, z^)
for all $ # ($ , 1), for all _(i), and for all | # 0.
Let z(ht , _(i), z) be the state reached in period t starting from z if the
public history is ht and i plays the pure strategy _(i). Let Z(ht , z)=
[z | z=z(ht , _(i), z) for some _(i)].
Definition 5. z$ and z" are related if [z$, z"]/Z(ht , z) for some
(ht , z).
The following assumption says that no action that the small players can
take has irreversible consequences.
Assumption 2 (Reversibility). There is a number N< with the
following property: Suppose that z$ and z" are related. Fix any (\(|)| # 0),
_ and any _(i). Then there is a pure strategy _~ (i) such that z(ht , _~ (i), z")
dominates z(ht , _(i), z$) given (\(|)| # 0), _ , * for some tN with
probability 1.12
Assumption 2 implies that whenever a small player deviates from the
equilibrium path then for every state he reaches along this deviation there
is a ‘‘return strategy’’ that allows the player to move back to the path
induced by the equilibrium strategy (or to a dominating path) irrespective
of the aggregate play.
Notice that the reversibility assumption is trivially satisfied in repeated
games. Reversibility is also satisfied if the transition function only depends
on the actions of the large player because in this case z$ and z" are related
if and only if z$=z".
Suppose that we can define a complete ordering on the states Z, such
that if z<z$ then z$ dominates z. Further suppose that if z^ is the maximal
state then z^ can be reached from all states for all actions of the large player.
In this case, Assumption 2 is satisfied. Note that this structure corresponds
to the case where the state variable represents human or physical capital
and the large player (government) cannot prevent the small players from
accumulating capital. Thus Assumption 2 is satisfied in Example 1.
A second class of examples in which Assumption 2 is satisfied is the case
where the transition can be expressed as a ‘‘chain.’’ Suppose that we can
order the states in Z as z0, z1, ..., zK, where zk&1, zk, zk+1 are the only
states that can be reached from zk for 2kK&1, z0 and z1 are the only
12 The probability distribution over histories is induced by ((\(|))| # 0 , _ , *). Notice that N
is independent of z$, z", (\(|))| # 0 , _ , and _(i).
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states that can be reached from z0, and zK and zK&1 are the only states that
can be reached from zK and moreover that the large player’s action cannot
prevent any of the feasible transitions in the sense that for every mixed
action r there exists an x that guarantees that the small player is in state
z$ in the next period if z$ is in the set of states that can be reached from
today’s state. In this case Assumption 2 is satisfied with N=K.
Assumption 2 is violated whenever the small player can reach a state z
which does not dominate all other states and from which the small player
cannot move away. In the durable goods monopoly example every
purchase corresponds to a movement to a permanent state. Moreover,
since purchasing at a low price is better than purchasing at a high price no
strictly positive price dominates all other states.
Our reversibility assumption is related to the assumption of ‘‘asymptotic
state independence’’ in Dutta [9] which requires the set of long-run feasible
and individually rational payoffs to be independent of the initial state for a
folk theorem to hold for stochastic games. In Dutta [9] this is needed in
order to ensure that individual deviations do not unilaterally affect future
payoff opportunities. In a similar fashion the reversibility assumption in our
context guarantees that a deviation of an individual small player does not
permanently reduce future payoff opportunities for that player.
Theorem 2. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied and that
|(T, n, 1) # 0 for all (T, n). Then lim inf$  1 Nl ($, $, *)sup W*(1, *).
The idea behind the proof of Theorem 2 is that we split up the infinite
game into finite superstages of length T. Note that the effect of a current
decision of a small player on the payoffs in future superstages can be
‘‘undone’’ in N periods or less by the reversibility assumption. If N is small
as compared to T then the small players will behave almost like short-lived
players in every superstage game, i.e., they will behave essentially as if they
were active only for one superstage game. Therefore the large player can
exploit his reputation if he convinces the small players that he will follow
the commitment strategy in the current superstage game.
If the reversibility assumption is violated it is possible to construct coun-
terexamples to Theorem 2. Below we give a counterexample for the durable
goods monopoly problem based on Example 2.
4.1. The Examples Revisited
Examples 1 satisfies Assumption 2 and hence the conclusion from the
previous section is unchanged. The equilibrium payoff of a patient govern-
ment is close to the best payoff the government can achieve. More
generally, Assumption 2 is satisfied in the framework considered by Chari
and Kehoe [3]. Hence we can conclude for this class of models that if both
19
the government and the households are very patient then in any Nash
equilibrium the problem of time inconsistency of optimal government
policy disappears in the perturbed game. In this case reputation effects
allow the government to achieve a payoff that is equal to the payoff it
could achieve by committing to an optimal policy.
Assumption 2 is violated in Example 2 (Section 2.2). If both the
monopolist and the buyers share a common discount factor $, then there
exists a sequential equilibrium in which the monopolist gets a payoff of
2(n&1)n for all $. Note that if the monopolist could commit to an
optimal policy then his payoff would be equal to the simple monopoly
payoff of 52.
To see that there is an equilibrium in the perturbed game which gives the
monopolist a payoff of 2(n&1)n, suppose that there are three types of
monopolists: one normal type characterized by the payoff function above;
type |*, who sets pt=(5n&1)n for all t; and type |^, who follows the
strategy
pt={(5n&1)n if tT(2n&1)n otherwise,
where log(12)log($)<T<log(2(3n+1))log $. Both commitment types
have prior probability =>0. Note that type |* satisfies the definition of
|(T, n, 1) for all n and all T.
The strategy of playing pt=(2n&1)n (for the normal type) constitutes
a sequential equilibrium for large $. To see this first note that
pt=(2n&1)n constitutes a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the game
where there is only the normal type if $ is sufficiently large. Thus it remains
to be shown that the normal type does not have an incentive to imitate
type |*. Suppose the large player deviates and offers pt=(5n&1)n. Since
=
2=
$T (5&(2n&1)n)>1n
type H will not buy until period T+1.13 However,
$T
1
2
}
5n&1
n
+$T+1
1
2
}
2n&1
n
<
7n&1
4n
<
2n&1
n
for n6, where the first element of the chain of inequalities is an upper
bound on the payoff to the monopolist from deviating and the last is the
13 The left-hand side of the inequality is a lower bound on the expected payoff from waiting
until T+1 and then buying at pT+1=(2n&1)n, and the right-hand side is the payoff from
buying at (5n&1)n at t=1.
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payoff from setting p1=(2n&1)n. This implies that a deviation from
p1=(2n&1)n does not pay. Thus in this game the large player is unable
to exploit reputational effects to achieve the simple monopoly payoff of
(5n&1)2n.
Remark. In the durable goods monopoly example we assume that the
monopolist cannot repurchase the durable good from the consumer. Note,
however, that Assumption 2 is violated even if we allow the monopolist to
repurchase the good. This is the case since the small players’s ability to
return to state 0 depends on the price the monopolist is willing to pay
when he repurchases the good. As long as we do not allow the monopolist
to commit to a particular repurchase price when he sells the good the above
example is robust to the introduction of repurchase by the monopolist.
Only if the monopolist could commit to a repurchase price would the
reversibility condition be satisfied. In this case the model would be strategi-
cally equivalent to a model in which the monopolist can rent the durable
goods to the buyers and, in accordance with existing literature (see Bulow
[2]), the monopolist can get the simple monopoly payoff.
4.2. Proof of Theorem 2
The following Lemma shows that if the small players believe that with
high enough probability the large player will play a given strategy in a
large enough truncation of the game, then they will play an = best response
to it provided that the reversibility assumption is satisfied.
Lemma 3. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied. Let \ be a given
pure strategy and let * be a given aggregate state. For any =>0 there are
:>0, $ <1 and T <, such that if the probability that \ is followed in the
first TT periods is greater than 1&:, then for all 1$$ if the small
players play a best response, _ # BT (=, 1, \, *). Moreover, :, $ and T are
independent of \ and *.
Proof. There are three reasons why small players may not want to play
an element in BT (=, 1, \, *1). First, \ will be followed with a probability
which is not sufficiently high; second, playing a best response may cause
the player to reach a state in period T which is not the optimal state for
the play thereafter; third, the player discounts future payoffs, instead of
using the time-average criterion.
Fix (\, _ ), let V Tt ($, ht)(i) be the expected payoff of player i along this
path in the T&t periods starting after ht and let V t*T(1, ht)(i) be the
maximal average payoff for a small player along this path if the game ends
in period T (the maximum is taken over the individual’s action x1 , .. , xT).
Let zT+1(i)(hT+1) be the state which is reached in period T+1 along this
path if hT+1 is the history and if _(i) is a pure strategy or the state which
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is reached with strictly positive probability under hT+1 which maximizes
the continuation payoff if _(i) is a mixed strategy.
If _  BT (=, 1, \, *1) then for some 1t$T&{, {<T= and for some i,
V Tt$(1, ht)(i)(1&:)(Vt$*
T(i)&=)+:v .
On the other hand, every small player can use the following strategy: for
the first T&N periods play a strategy that maximizes the average payoff in
the first T periods against (\, _ ); in the last N periods, adjust the state so
that in period tT+1 the state z^t(ht) is reached, where z^t(ht) dominates
zt(ht). Assumption 2 guarantees that such a return strategy starting in
period T&N+1 exists. (Simply consider the subform starting in period
T&N+1. For every state reached in period T&N, Assumption 2 guaran-
tees that there exists a _^ such that for some tT+1 a state z^t(ht) is
reached that dominates zt(ht).)
This gives a lower bound on V Tt$(1, ht)(i), 1t$T&{:
V Tt$(1, ht)(i)(1&:) Vt$*
T(i)&v
N
{
.
If
(1&:) =>v
N
{
+:v
small player i ’s average payoff increases when he switches to the prescribed
strategy. Recalling that {<T=, it is easy to see that this inequality can be
satisfied if T is sufficiently large and : is sufficiently close to zero. Since
V Tt$($, ht)(i) converges to V
T
t$(1, ht)(i) uniformly for all ht we can choose a
$ sufficiently close to one so that the conclusion holds for all $>$ and
hence the lemma follows. K
Proof of Theorem 2. The rest of the proof of Theorem 2 is omitted as
it is identical to the proof of Theorem 1 once we replace $ with 1, Lemma 2
with Lemma 3, and ; with $.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we investigate reputation in dynamic games with a large
player and a large number of small players whose individual actions are
not observed. We consider two different environments:
(1) The small players are less patient than the large player, i.e., the
small players’ discount factor is bounded away from 1 while the large
player is arbitrarily patient.
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(2) Both the large and the small players are arbitrarily patient and
the transition function satisfies a reversibility condition which ensures that
a deviation of an individual small player does not permanently reduce
future payoff opportunities for that player.
For both cases we show that every Nash equilibrium the large player
gets a payoff close to the largest payoff he could get by optimally commit-
ting to a pure strategy in a finite truncation of the game if the initial
aggregate state is the least favorable among the states that can be reached
under the commitment strategy.
When the small players’ discount factor is fixed, we show that reputation
is a substitute for commitment in the classical time-inconsistency and
durable goods monopoly problems. An example of a trade liberalization
game shows how reputation may fail to have equilibrium implications if a
state can be reached that prevents the large player from gaining from
reputation.
In the case in which the large and the small players are arbitrarily
patient, we show that reputation is a substitute for commitment if the
transition function is such that no strategy of a small player has irreversible
consequences on his payoff opportunities. This condition fails to be
satisfied in the durable goods monopoly case (in which purchase leads to
an absorbing state) and an example shows that in this case reputational
arguments fail.
Throughout the paper we assume that the transition between aggregate
states is deterministic and that commitment types only use pure strategies.
Both these assumptions can be relaxed. In particular, our results can be
extended to allow for reputation for mixed strategies and stochastic tran-
sition of the aggregate state by adopting a framework similar to Fudenberg
and Levine [12]. Since in this case the link between the large players’
choices and the observed outcome is stochastic the large player is subject
to moral hazard. Even imperfect observations, however, provide some
information about the large player’s choices, and therefore an analog for
the ‘‘learning lemma’’ (Lemma 1) can be found also in this case along the
lines of Theorem 4.1 in Fudenberg and Levine [13]. In general the
possibility of commitment to a mixed strategy will lead to an improved
payoff bound in a similar way as in the case of repeated games.
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